Abstract -Health Information Systems (HIS) are often deployed with inadequate security mechanisms and with users being generally pointed out as the weakest link. The launch of the Portuguese digital national identification smart card, the Citizen Card (CC), with strong authentication and digital signing capabilities, represents a new and viable economic opportunity for securing a HIS and at the same time foster the creation of a much more secure national health information infrastructure. Smart cards are being deployed in healthcare in several places around the world with highly encouraging results. Major programs have already been deployed with great success, although there are some well identified issues that need to be addressed. The CC is a versatile and secure card, with the latest in encryption and tamper resistance technologies, with standard support for a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). We present the advantages and enumerate some of the problems of using a smart card in a HIS, as well as the CC possible contributions in this area, namely as an easy, inexpensive, widely deployed way of using current technology to protect HIS security, and ultimately patient information, while at the same time fostering the expansion and deployment of inter operable HIS. Issues are identified that will need to be resolved and a detailed plan for further work to assess the level of impact the CC can have on the national HIS is indicated.
I. INTRODUCTION
Health Information Systems (HIS) are growing all over the world, with great benefit for patients, care providers and healthcare workers. However, this expansion has been sometimes impaired by concerns of privacy and data confidentiality, with repeated examples of failures and breaches of security [1; 2] .
HIS are difficult to protect from unauthorized use, because of the large number of people generally involved in healthcare providing, the unawareness of users about security concerns and the complexity of secure architectures for HIS. It is known for a long time that login/password authentication management is one of the main unresolved problems in Information Technologies (IT) Security [3] . Users tend to be the weakest link, since they usually choose small and easy to remember password, use the same password in various applications, with many passwords ending up being exchanged between unauthorized people or stored in unsafe locations. Furthermore, new steps in electronic healthcare (e-Health) for a broader, yet safer, healthcare network, require changes in HIS authentication mechanisms for the purpose of secure remote transactions of data, liability and non-repudiation, Smart card authentication for the purpose of securing information systems is a well documented, versatile and secure technology, widely used as a substitution or complement of login/password based authentication. There are however several difficulties related to the implementation and deployment of these technologies within healthcare in the context of a large hospital, a whole region or even a country.
Portugal is rolling out a new model for its national identification card, and is planning for it to be available nationwide by the end of 2008. The Citizen Card (CC) is a smart card which will substitute several documents and has strong remote authentication and digital signing capabilities by means of asymmetric cryptography. Because all the complexity involved with testing and deploying the card, as well as having the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is already in place, the authors discuss and analyze the plausibility of using this same card in a HIS setting, thus providing the basis for strong security and privacy, as well as determining its ease of use in a Healthcare setting.
The main characteristics of the CC will be reviewed and its security, usability and usefulness will be assessed, as a means of authenticating patients and health professionals in a HIS setting.
II. METHODS
A thorough search was conducted for bibliographical references containing various combinations of the following terms: Smart Card, e-health, authentication, electronic health record, health record, protection, identity verification, healthcare PKI on Medline, Google Scholar and Scopus. Data was further filtered by date, on most searches for the last 5 years but, on some, for the last 3 years, and papers were selected by title and abstract, content relevance to the subject, and, whenever possible, the full text retrieved for further study.
The site www.cartaodecidadao.pt (official CC site) was analyzed for data on the CC as well as all the information referred. The documentation on the cards chip and software was also retrieved.
III. BACKGROUND

A. The Law
Health information is protected by law in many countries. In the United States of America, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) [4] emphasizes, since 1996, the privacy of health information, and the need for its confidentiality, integrity and availability. The European Union issued guidelines on patient data protection [5] , and Portugal protects health information as an individual's property, subject to confidentiality [6] . The handling of health information is a great responsibility, and a HIS must be able to deal with thousands of individual records, protecting them from misuse.
B. The Problem
In 2004, the Portuguese National Committee on Data protection audited 38 hospitals on personal data processing [7] . They found 14 applications without password, passwords visible on stickers next to workstations on 2 hospitals, as well as several users stating that the passwords were their own name. The negative asserted conclusions were no surprise, as previous works on the subject have already been raising similar concerns for almost 30 years [3] .
C. The Solution
The state of the art in security and strategies for HIS has already been discussed in previous works [1; 8; 9; 10; 11] . Strong and effective authentication is undoubtedly necessary in such systems. We have to be able to trust the machines and users, and for that, we need to know with great certainty who they are, so they exert their privileges and be liable for misuse. In this matter, the identification, proper maintenance and administration of machines and systems is out of the scope of the present work, but is undoubtedly an important aspect of security that must be taken into account.
1) Authentication:
A user can identify himself by three classic methods: by providing something he knows (e.g. a password); something he has (e.g. a smart card or other token); or something he is (e.g. biometrics -gait, fingerprint, etc.). A combination of these methods can be used to enhance security [12] . a) Passwords: need to be difficult to guess, which is in direct conflict with ease of use. Humans tend to forget them and thus have a tendency to pick passwords that are very easy to remember. These easy passwords get less secure each time they are used. On the other hand, administration and deployment of passwords based systems is easy and cheap, hence its broad use [13] . b) Biometrics: this is many times referred as the -almost perfect‖ solution. There are however various arguments against biometric technologies [14] : They are fairly expensive to deploy; the user can not change a compromised biometric; there are various known attacks on biometric systems; there are concerns on privacy [15] and usable biometrics also have errors, especially in identification mode when confronted with very large user databases. c) Token authentication: is based on the possession of something physical that can be uniquely associated with a certain entity and very hard to reproduce. It is very common to use smart cards as security tokens. They are very flexible and secure: but also have some drawbacks. If lost, there is the possibility of system compromise. They can be, however, revoked, and re-issued. One also needs to carry it, it is not free and requires some effort to deploy and manage. If combined with a password or PIN, a token can safely store or generate multiple passwords and secret codes, which obviates the task of remembering multiple, changing passwords to one of remembering only the single password needed to access and activate the token. It also provides compromise detection, since its absence is observable (opposed to a password), and it provides added protection against denial-of-service (DoS) attacks (a person can try to login and lock multiple accounts in a login/password authentication scheme, but with the requirement of a security token, only someone with a valid active token can try to logon into the system).
D. Smart Cards
Smart cards are memory only or processor-enabled semiconductor based technology. For the scope of this work, we will consider only the latter. Smart cards generally contain a chip with a few hundred bytes of RAM, and may also have special circuitry to perform cryptographic operations such as RSA public key encryption, signatures and verification. The data stored on a smart card can be protected by active data encryption schemes and/or biometric identification. Smart cards are extremely difficult to duplicate/clone. These cards have bi-directional data flow: data is read from, as well as written to the card. In general, smart cards support the storage of information that can be -read-only,‖ -added-only,‖ -updated-only,‖ or not accessible. They can support the use of java-based or other applications, have an interface by contact, contactless or both. Processor-enabled smart card software is stored in permanent nonvolatile, read-only memory. Application data stored on the card is kept in Electronically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory (EE-PROM). The contents of this memory may be erased and new data can be reloaded electronically and they have an embedded silicon-based 8, 16, or 32-bit processor, with even the 8-bit microprocessor-based smart card being almost as powerful as the desktop PCs of the early 1980s [16] .
E. The Smart Card Use in HIS Setting
There are many examples of smart card deployment and use in HIS. Germany, France, Canada have some of the big projects. The Smart Card Alliance published a report on the use of smart cards in HIS, and its contribution to HIPAA compliance [17] , in which they are pointed out as a very good solution for the majority of known issues in this setting.
Modern HIS need to grow outside their home institutions, they need to connect. Electronic Health Records (EHR) should be easy to access, yet only by whom has permission to do so, and people need to know and trust their own security [18] . Therefore, the need for secure and strong authentication is urgent and clear.
Over 80 million memory-only smart cards are currently being used in the German's healthcare system. France's Sésam-Vitale program includes 10 million cards in its family plan and some 35 million individual cards [19] . These systems are growing fast and are very successful.
A work by Liu et all [20] detailed the introduction of the smart card based health insurance card in Taiwan, and pointed some failures in the project, such as increased time (60.6% of inquiries) servicing patients caused by: impairment of the cards (31.2%); failure in authentication; malfunction in card readers (15.3%); problems with interfaces between the card readers and hospital information systems (15.8%). Taiwan is currently deploying one of the largest healthcare smart-card based solutions in the world, and lessons learned with its implementation are invaluable, such as the need for a marketing strategy, security audits, a comprehensive HIS security plan and integration testing and acceptance procedures [17] .
The Canada experience also pointed the need for professionals and patients to understand and recognize the benefits of adopting smart cards [21] .
HIS can also greatly benefit from asymmetric cryptography. Users can authenticate themselves univocally, as well as sign documents in a liable way, with the possibility of doing it remotely [22] .
IV. THE CITIZEN CARD
Portugal, like most European countries, has had for many years now a government issued national identification card, other than the passport (countries like the USA, Canada, Australia or the United Kingdom do not have such identification) [23] . It serves has the identification credentials document before public and private entities. This document is in the process of being replaced by a more secure, practical and functional document, which will incorporate other government documents previously issued separately.
Finland, for instance, was a pioneer in the electronic ID concept. Such cards were firstly issued by this country in December 1999. They were, however, optional, and not very successful (75.000 units emitted until December 2005) [23] .
The Citizen Card (Cartão de Cidadão -CC) is a multiple identification document which includes an optic machinereadable zone (MRZ) and an Integrated circuit (IC). It is meant to substitute 4 identification documents, possibly 5 in the near future: National Identity; Social Security; National Health System; Tax Payer's. It may substitute the Elector's Card (ID for elections) in the near future. It is a move to an easier relationship between the government and the citizen, although it does not, in accordance to the Portuguese constitutional law, cross-reference the data between the public organisms to which the documents refer.
In Figure 1 , the security aspects of the card are represented [24] . Table I enumerates the CC's information content and the place where it is held. The document number, which is the civil ID number plus 2 alphanumeric characters and 1 control digit allows to know the state of the card, namely if it has been revoked.
The authentication certificate is activated when the card is delivered. The electronic signature certificate is activated only if asked for, and only by citizens over 16 years old, fully capable. These certificates are revocable at all times, but their replacement is dependent on the issuing of a new document.
The card is also digitally signed by the emitting entity. The software applications stored in the card are: IAS (Identification, Authentication and Electronic Signature) -On-chip authentication and digital signing, which means the private keys never leave the card. The middleware permits direct communication with this application. It allows the signing of documents and authentication through a web browser; EMV-CAP -Random one-time password generation, for use in alternative channels, such as telephone; Match-oncard -fingerprint verification (only for use by authorities in special circumstances)
An application is available for download which permits user interaction with the aforementioned capabilities, as well as a middleware technical manual [25] [27] . They comply with European regulations on electronic signing and with internationally accepted standards [28] .
The CC has a 5 years expiration date. It is issued only to Portuguese citizens (with Portuguese nationality) and to Brazilian citizens covered by the Porto Seguro treaty. The latter documents will not serve as a travel document. The CC is not mandatory to whoever has a valid document substituted by it, but will be issued automatically whenever a change or renewal of one of the documents is requested.
The security is state of the art, but the possible security exploits are constantly being perfected, and new ones can also be found. There are various examples of known smart card exploits, that companies try to circumvent and render harmless [29; 30] .
A. Healthcare Use of CC
The CC holds key data for healthcare, as shown in table 1, without including personal information. This means it holds only the necessary identity information for admission in a hospital, for example.
In its proof of concept [31] , the CC was analyzed for the purpose of electronic medical prescription. By connecting to a central database, and after authentication by the patient, a doctor can see the database and prescribe electronically. The prescription is stored (in real-time) for later viewing in the pharmacy, where, after the same authentication procedure, the pharmacist can see the prescription and give the medication. The advantages publicized are the rationalizing of prescription (the application possesses a decision support system), fraud and error preventing, and the creation of a centralized prescriptions database. Another work on this subject presented similar solutions [32] .
V. HIS SECURITY AND SMART CARDS
The concerns of privacy and security in the medical informatics field are related to the need of professionals and patients to trust the system. IT security can only present the means for that trust to happen, in a non intrusive, easier way. Smart cards indeed offer an easy way for the average person to become involved in a secure IT environment.
The need to expand HIS outside home institutions, for a regional or national EHR, and for the creation of a Personal Health Record (PHR) which should interchange data with, or be based on the EHR [33] , are very challenging tasks when it comes to security. A PKI and smart cards can be an effective solution for this problem. However, the deployment of such a solution can be very expensive and difficult [34] .
A. The Citizen Card in HIS
The CC is based on the latest well tested smart card technologies. Its IC has top security and versatility features. As expected for such an important document, it supports state of the art active defenses against tampering, the latest encryption technologies and proven software from a major supplier, as well as top security certification. It has great support for the user, simple software, multi-platform compatibility, good technical guides, and the only thing the user has to buy to use it online is a relatively inexpensive cardreader, which is available at low prices at CC stores (for around 15€).
The CC's public key cryptography, based on RSA 1024 bit keys, is adequate and recommended for these purposes, although more secure keys (2048 bit) would ease the minds of less optimistic voices, since the former is, nowadays, the minimum recommended by many authorities in this matter. RSA is, however, a proven viable solution, and it only makes sense to adopt it for this purpose. The fact that 2 keys (authentication and digital signing) are being set in the CC leads us to another line of security. The user needs to understand the difference between signing and authenticating (because it has to choose the operation), one can leave signing deactivated (e.g. for minors) and a compromised key does not compromise the other. The card also has a 5 years expiration date, which leads to a fairly short life cycle, so that vulnerabilities can be addressed or upgrades deployed in future revisions.
Overall, in the light of the current literature, the CC has the potential to be a good example for the deployment of these devices. Time will tell if the framework already in place will hold this expectation.
When it comes to Healthcare, the use of the CC for electronic prescription is less than ambitious. This card has a much wider potential usage. Its strong authentication capability can be used for online banking, as well as public services identification. And it is already prepared to be used in this way by public and private entities, at the user's discretion. The healthcare system may greatly benefit from the CC. It provides static identifiers that can be used for preventing record duplication, or to find different institution records for the same person. It is unifying, as it can potentially be used to authorize a procedure in a hospital, fill a prescription in the pharmacy or access medical records from a doctor's private practice. It can be part of the answer to all the fears of privacy loss or security within the HIS, since by its use all actions could be logged and traced to a single person. It can also substitute many of the technologies being rolled out, which are more expensive (like biometrics), and lack the CC's readiness and deployment abstraction.
There are, however, a few aspects that could undermine its use in HIS.
1) Professionals potential problems:
Healthcare professionals have special ways of working. They do a lot of multitasking, tend to have busy times with various issues on their minds, and often deal with delicate situations and even life or death decisions. Such a stressful and busy line of work is not always compatible with the IT requirements or work flows, and that is one of the reasons HIS do sometimes fail to improve care. Informatics tend to be organized and rigid, far from the apparent chaos involved in diagnosing a disease, for example.
This way, and although the use of CC could substantially improve the healthcare professional relation with the HIS, it should be stressed that it has to be on a clearly helpful, understandable and unobtrusive way. Like any other setting, the system should be tested for usability. There may be some resistance in using one's ID card in the line of work, every time interaction with the system is needed, it may take longer than ordinarily takes to log. There is always the possibility of forgetting the token, which would undermine the system. There is also the obvious problem of non Portuguese healthcare workers, that cannot have a similar card, though a quite simple solution would be to have a small setting PKI, for issuing cards for those workers.
An acceptance testing took place in Slovenia regarding smart cards in healthcare, and results were positive, but these were dedicated cards [35] .
2) Patients potential problems:
Less literate patients may have problems with using the card (and be potential targets for fraud), although CC use is similar to the use of a common debit card, quite common for many years now. There are also special requirements, particular to healthcare, that need to be addressed, such as ways to access information in an emergency situation, when the citizen does not have its card or is not conscious.
Following advices from previous smart card implementations, it is necessary to have and demonstrate clear advantages for the use of the card, as well as a marketing support and campaigns to support them.
The Implementation of the CC in a HIS environment, although less complex than starting from scratch, still demands much hard work for testing all the functionalities and potentialities described in this paper.
Security is not exclusively dependent on authentication or on the user. This is just one of the important items of IT security. Securing HIS is not an easy job, but it may become significantly easier with the implementation and integration of an architecture that supports the CC. Role based access, for example, could be more easily built if such an infrastructure is already in place.
B. The Citizen Card as an Expansion Adjuvant of HIS
A web based framework with a central repository for information is arguably a good solution for a nation wide EHR, in which all players would have access to software in the form of continuously updated applets, thus needing only a browser and internet connection to be able to use the system. One of the most difficult aspects, in this scenario, is to warrant the security of the system. A PKI with smart cards is arguably one of the best proven ways of doing so [36] . With the CC and a card reader, along with clearly defined access policies, this could no longer represent an issue.
Secure remote authentication with this kind of framework leads to new possibilities, such as:
 A PHR managed, or co-managed, by the patient. This puts the patient in charge of their health records, giving him the opportunity to gather and distribute their health information as they see fit.  Authorization of clinical data access in any place by the patient himself;  Telemedicine or e-health: remote health work or remote expert consultation is a rapidly developing field. The CC could be used to secure connections between hospitals, to sign documents and reports with legal validity, making these applications less vulnerable and permitting an efficient allocation of personnel without harm for patients (ex. Radiology experts).  A true National EHR is very difficult to implement, but trust is the basis of such work. Trust from patients, from healthcare personnel, official entities and healthcare management. The CC has the potential of helping to create this trust, the same way people trust a bank. The CC is built to be secure, and its legal bindingness should facilitate various remote processes.
Of course, for most of these uses, much work has to be done other than the simple use of the CC authentication capabilities. Still, a part of the various expected problems can be more easily managed.
There are a few companies involved in the maintenance of an online PHR as a paid service [33] . Recently, two major software companies (Google and Microsoft) joined the market with free PHR products [37; 38] .
These are rather new, but they open some public/private collaboration opportunities, as they are already collaborating with various healthcare (namely private) entities. The patient has full control of their records. As some may feel uncomfortable trusting their health information to a private company, encryption could ease this feeling, or, at least, han-dling of access authorization via CC, as a much more secure authentication method than login/password. Security implementations should overcome the differences in security architectures, giving each individual system the autonomy to its own security administration, while complying with certain policies on data manipulation and transfer [8] .
The user authentication can be made by presentation of credentials, which in this case is the CC, in any given healthcare provider, and transaction of data from other locations would be easily done, since the user/patient is authenticated and can authorize it.
One particular characteristic of the Portuguese national health system is that the public healthcare is the standard, which could greatly facilitate deployment of such architecture, as there are much less companies and entities to hinder the agreement on standards and policies.
C. Future Work
It is necessary to address the CC use in a real clinical setting, implement and deploy HIS support for the card, and assess its contribution to security and determine and assess difficulties, if applicable, to usability. In a first study, healthcare professionals will be addressed, with or without patient CC's. Opinions from HIS users will be collected. There are various ways in which the CC can be used for authentication and/or signing in a HIS. A base architecture is being created and deployed in a versatile way for testing, so that changes for different systems become easier to implement. A large hospital will be the setting for initial testing, although with an initial reduced user base.
With the all its potential, if proven safe, easy to use, and well accepted, the CC could revolutionize HIS in Portugal, as other smart cards have already done in other parts of the world. It may also pave the way for a national EHR, and its associated PHR. Now that expectations have been created, and the CC is rolling out, it is time to experience its use in a HIS, and determine if the raised expectations can be met.
VI. CONCLUSION
HIS cannot, and should not, be allowed to grow and expand as long as their security is less than sate of the art. Networks of computers have been around for many years and much experience can be drawn from past mistakes, so these should not be repeated. More than upholding the law, HIS security must protect individuals the same way a trusting doctor is sworn to secrecy.
The CC is a major technological advance in a number of areas in Portugal, and it can be so in e-health, and in securing existent HIS. It can also facilitate the broad acceptance of IT in healthcare. The fact that most healthcare providers are also public companies could help broaden the adoption of more secure and helpful technologies, such as EHR and PHR.
Much further studying and testing is needed, as this work can only be considered a first and very preliminary tackling of an old, but often overlooked complex problem. But the players are there, and they play fine… We should just find a way to make them play together.
